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KENTuCKY LAW JouINAL

RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL IN NONCAPITAL FELONY PROSECUTIONS - WOLFORD v
BUCHANAN - RULE OF CHOLSON CASE MODIFIED?
In the recent Kentucky case of Wolford v Buchanan,' Emerson
Wolford, who had been convicted of housebreaking and sentenced to
life imprisonment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act,2 was
denied his freedom by the Court of Appeals on an appeal from the
circuit court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus. One of the grounds
of his petition was that he had been deprived of due process m that
the court failed to appoint counsel to defend him and did not advise
him concerning his legal rights.
The record of the case is silent on the point as to whether he had
counsel, but in his petition and affidavit the prisoner alleged that he
had secured the services of an attorney who stated: "You have nothing
to worry about for they have no case against you" but who, on the day
of the trial, told the prisoner. "I can't do anything for you so I am not
going to defend you." 3 On this evidence the Court of Appeals dismissed the point, saying: "By petitioners affidavit we see that he did
have the benefit of counsel, and counsel selected by him. There is
nothing to show here that the court was ever apprised of the fact
that the selected counsel refused to continue his service. ' 4 The court
then cited the recent significant case of Gholson v Commonwealth,5
we dealt with the
which it summarized by saying: "In [that case]
questions of the duty of the court to appoint counsel and the waiver
of rights to counsel. It was held in substance that the question to be
determined in all such cases is whether or not it sufficiently appears
that the accused was informed of his legal rights and intelligently
waived his right to be represented by counsel."6
The Gholson case was hailed as a great judicial step
towards securing equal protection of law for rich and poor alike in
Kentucky 7 It has been interpreted by one writer s as establishing a
constitutional nght9 of an accused to have counsel assigned, and to be
informed by the trial judge of his right thereto. This conforms substantially to the interpretation of that case which the court itself
put on it in the Wolford case in the language above quoted, since the
'313 Ky. 512, 232 S.W 2d 1016 (1950).
Ky. REv STAT. see. 431.190 (1948).

'Wolford v. Buchanan, 318 Ky. 512, 513, 232 S.W 2d 1016, 1017 (1950).
4 Id. at 514, 232 S.W 2d at 1017.
-308 Ky. 82, 212 S.W 2d 537 (1948).
'Wolford v. Buchanan, 313 Ky. 512, 514, 232 S.W 2d 1016, 1017 (1950).
Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 317 (1950).
'Ibzd.
'Under Ky. CONST. sec. 11.
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court states that the case dealt with (1) "the duty of the court to apaccused was informed of his legal
point counsel," (2) "whether
rights" and (3) "waiver of rights to counsel."
The question which then confronts this and future petitioners upon
reading this opinion is: Why was not the petition sufficient? The
opinion does not make it clear. We shall investigate the reasonable
possibilities in a categorical manner.
1. Petitionerhad effective counsel.
Although the court said that the petitioner in his affidavit admitted
that he had counsel selected by himself, the right is to an effective assignment of counsel, and in the same affidavit the petitioner alleged
that his counsel had abandoned him before the trial. There is nothing
in the record to indicate that he was represented by counsel at the
trial. The trial judge in the habeas corpus proceeding, who must
pass on all questions of law and fact in that hearing, 1 sustained a
demurrer to the petition and hence did not determine the issue of fact
as to whether or not the petitioner had effective counsel at the trial.
Since the demurrer admits that all the facts alleged are true, if it was
sustained on the ground of effective counsel, the judge would in
effect rule that counsel who abandons his client the day of the trial
is effective. It is submitted that this could not be a reasonable answer.
2. Petitioner made an effective waiver of counsel by failing to
insist on the appointment.
If, as the court said, in these cases the only question was whether
it sufficiently appears that the accused was informed of his legal rights
and intelligently waived his right to be represented by counsel, then
the court may have dismissed the petition because it found such a
waiver. But we are dealing with the duty of a trial court to appoint
counsel. It is doubtful that the court can be relieved of this duty by
the failure of petitioner to insist on appointment.i It would appear
that a valid waiver relieving the court of this duty would result only
when the accused was informed of his right to have counsel appointed,
inquired of as to whether he desired counsel, and when the accused
then intelligently decided that he did not.
The record is silent as to whether the trial judge informed accused
2 Am. Jun., 247.
2.5
See Gholson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 82, 84, 212 S.V 2d 537, 538
(1948), where the court said "In recent cases we have held that a trial court is
under no duty or obligation to assign counsel to a defendant where he fails to
make a request therefor." citing- Hamlin v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 22, 152
S.W 2d 297 (1941); Moore v. Commonwealth, 298 Kv. 14, 181 S.W 2d 413
(1944). These cases were specifically overruled b3y the court in the Gholson casa
"
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of his right to counsel, whether he was asked if he desired counsel,
and whether he decided not to avail himself thereof. It might be
inferred that he knew of his legal right to be represented from the
fact that he employed counsel, but it does not follow that he knew
of his right to have counsel appointed by the court. Again, the ruling
on the demurrer could only have decided that although what the
petitioner says about not having counsel or being informed of his right
to an appointment is true, he waived this right by failing to ask for
counsel. As has been indicated, it is doubtful if an affirmative duty
to make an appointment can be discharged by the failure of the party
in whose favor the obligation exists to insist on it,.particularly when he
may not be aware of his right.
3. An accused is entitled only to a trial before a judge who is not
consciously denying him effective counsel.
The court announced an objective rule in the Gholson case: that
a fair and impartial trial in felony cases includes informing the accused
at the beginning of the trial by the judge of hIs legal rights, and appointment of counsel by the court unless the accused intelligently
waives this right.
A third explanation of this case is that the court applied the rule
subjectively in the Wolford case, making it depend upon whether or
not the trial judge knew that the accused was represented by counsel,
else why should the court state "There is nothing to show here that
the court was ever apprised of the fact." This is not in keeping with
the spirit of the Gholson decision, in which it was said that "It is ncumbent upon the trial judge to determine whether the waiver of a
right to be represented by counsel is made 'intelligently, competently,
understandingly and voluntarily [Italics writer s]."12
It is to be hoped that the court did not intend in the W1olford case
to limit the Gholson rule by making it subjective. This interpretation
of the Wolford case is not borne out by the extremely short treatment
of the rule in that case, nor is it compatible with the statement of the
rule in the Gholson case.
It may be that the rule remains the same and the court merely
erred in the application of it to this fact situation. However, a more
reasonable explanation still remains.
4. The choice of remedy was wrong- habeas corpus will not lie
to correct a defect not apparent on the face of the record.
The Gholson case makes it clear that the right to have counsel
appointed is enforceable on appeal: that is, a new trial will be ordered
' Gholson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 82, 88, 212 S.W 2d 537, 540 (1948).
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unless the court informs the accused of his legal rights and a waiver
of counsel is made intelligently Since it seems doubtful that the cases
may be distinguished on other grounds, it would seem from the Wolford case that this right may not be asserted in a petition for habeas
corpus, although the court itself makes no such distinction m its
opinion. If denial of counsel makes the proceeding void, the fact that
the time for appeal has expired does not ordinarily foreclose relief.i 3
However, m Kentucky habeas corpus lies only- to relieve petitioner
of a sentence imposed when the judgment is invalid to the extent of
rendering it void, and the invalidating defects are shown in the record
of the trial.14 The modem tendency in other jurisdictions is to extend
the scope of inquiry in habeas corpus to preserve the constitutional
safeguards to human liberty Ii.Despite statements to the contrary in
Smith v Buchanan,0 the very fact that the court considered Wolford's
appeal on its merits indicates that it believes that the denial of counsel
in a felony case is of such invalidating effect as to make the judgment
void. Although habeas corpus lies only when the invalidating defects
are shown in the record of the trial and evidence contradicting the
record is nadmissible,T still here there is nothing in the record contradictory to the allegations in his petition that he was not informed
of his legal rights and not represented by counsel. It is true that a
judgment of a court of record cames with it a presumption of regularity, and the petitioner in habeas corpus must prove by the preponderance of evidence that he did not make an intelligent waiver,',
but a question of fact is presented here which calls for a hearing and
the demurrer should have been overruled, unless the court intended
to make a presumption based on the silence of the record conclusive
that there was counsel or that an intelligent waiver existed. It is enWilliams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 Sup. Ct. 363 (1945).

See Johnson v.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 610 (1938); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329,
61 Sup. Ct. 572 (1941).
" Smith v. Buchanan, 291 Ky. 44, 163 S.W 2d 5 (1942).
"25 AM. Jtm. 179.

" 291

Ky. 44, 46, 163 S.W 2d 5, 7 (1942).

In this case the trial court had

assigned as counsel to represent a murder defendant a person who, after the trial,
was found not to be a licensed attorney. The court considered this an unknown

error, not appearing on the face of the record, and said that in the case of such
errors, although a right to which the defendant was entitled was demed him,
habeas corpus would not lie. They later stated that although some courts hold
that a demal to a litigant of some constitutional right makes a judgment void,
most courts will not allow habeas corpus if the trial court had jurisdiction of the
cause.
This case may be distinguished from the Wolford case in that there the demal
of counsel was evident, in a sense, on the face of the record, as there was no

mention of counsel in the record.
" 2.5
AM. Junt. 245.

" ORFMLD, CRIMNAL PROcEDuRE

427 (1947).
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tirely arguable that the silence of the record on the matters of counsel,
information and waiver is a "defect apparent on the face of the record"
under the Kentucky rule requrng the appointment of counsel, and if
the decision rested on this procedural ground the court should have
decided that the defect was apparent. However, it is reasonable to
assume that the court was governed by the fear they announced in
the Smith case, that had the writ of habeas corpus been issued, the
prisoner would be entitled to a release, "which might result in his final
escape from apprehension and punishment for the commission of his
crime." 9 They probably felt it would be poor precedent to set free a
prisoner on habeas corpus merely because the record of his trial did
not indicate whether he had been represented by counsel, when this
matter could be taken care of much more expeditiously on appeal,
and a new trial ordered whereunder a guilty person might still be
confined.
Therefore, it is submitted that the court, after considering the consequences of either choice, may have decided that failure of the court
to inform accused of his right to have counsel appointed and to appoint counsel unless intelligently waived was- a defect not apparent
on the face of the record when no mention of it was made in the
record, and that habeas corpus would not lie in this situation. It is
apparent that the writ of habeas corpus will be unavailable to practically every defendant in this situation, because mention of counsel
will rarely find its way into the record unless the accused asks for it,
which is unlikely and in which case the trial court would probably
appoint counsel.
There is hope that, although habeas corpus is not the appropriate
remedy, this right may yet be vindicated. The writ of coram nobis
has been recently revived in Kentucky and will lie when there is a
material error of fact not appearing in the record and unknown to
the trial court, and not due to any lack of diligence on the part of the
defendant.20 Since the writ has been revived to provide a remedy for
unfortunate cases, principally those of newly discovered evidence,
falling outside the scope of habeas corpus and results in a new trial
rather than immediate freedom for the petitioner, it is very possible
that it may lie in a situation like the Wolford case.
If the court's fears of a general jail delivery make it impossible for
it to evolve a rule requiring an effective appointment of counsel in
every felony case because of the necessary retroactivity of the rule,
" Smith v. Buchanan, 291 Ky. 44, 49, 163 S.W 2d 5, 8 (1942).
'Note, 89 Ky. L.I. 440 (1951), citing Smith v. Buchanan, 291 Ky. 44, 163
SW 2d 5 (1942); Anderson v. Buchanan, 292 Ky. 810, 168 S.W 2d 48 (1943).
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perhaps the time has come for the legislature to amend the criminal
code to provide, like the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that:
"If the defendant
court shall advise him of his
represent him at every stage
proceed without counsel or is

appears in court without counsel, the
right to counsel and assign counsel to
of the proceedings unless he elects to
able to obtain counsel."'

GEORGE R. CREEDLE

NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER IN KENTUCKY THE RULE IN
MARYE v COMMONWEALTH'
What degree of negligence is reqmred in Kentucky for a conviction
of manslaughter? This question is of particular importance in Kentucky since the statutes set out the punishment for voluntary man2
slaughter but do not attempt to define the elements of the crime.
Involuntary manslaughter remains a common law crnme 3 with the
4
punishment being fixed by a general statute.
In a case decided in 1919,5 where the homicide resulted from the
negligent operation of an automobile, the tort standard of care was
applied and on a finding of ordinary negligence the defendant was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Seven years later in a similar
case involving a homicide resulting from the negligent operation of
an automobile,6 the court said that failure to exercise ordinary care
in the driving of an automobile was sufficient negligence to constitute
the crime of involuntary manslaughter. These cases were followed in
Kentucky, and the law seemed to be settled that ordinary negligence
in the operation of an automobile was sufficient to authorize a con7
viction of involuntary manslaughter.
As one might expect, since the court had resorted to the rule that
ordinary negligence was sufficient to constitute involuntary manslaughter, when it was later confronted with a case involving a greater
degree of negligence and consequently deserving a greater degree of
punishment, the natural solution was to convict the guilty party of
- FED. R. Crm. P. 44.

1240 S.W 2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 435.020 (1948).
3

Sikes v. Com., 304 Ky. 429, 200 S.W 2d 956 (1947).

'Ky. Rmv. STAT. see. 431.075 (1950).

'Held v. Com., 183 Ky. 209, 208 S.W 772 (1919).
'Jones v. Com., 213 Kv. 356, 281 S.W 164 (1926).
'Lewis v. Com., 301 Ky. 268, 191 S.W 2d 416 (1945); Lowe v. Com., 298

Ky. 7, 181 S.W 2d 409 (J944); Com. v. Mullins, 296 Ky. 190, 176 S.W 2d 403
(1943).

